Whether we, as working psychiatrists, like it or not, our patients frequently elude the relatively coarse net of the DSM classifications. Individual cases are often far more complicated in real life than can be described by its diagrammatic but spare axes. Even with all its faults, however, the DSM system is still the best we have at present; for statistical purposes, insurance companies, and research projects, it will have to do for the time being. Nevertheless, in the engagement with human beings in all their complexity, we need more subtle and comprehensive models. For a time, it looked as if the marvellously ingenious intellectual structure of psychoanalysis, with its powerful "explain everything" apparatus, was the paradigm of human normalcy, social existence, art, politics, and pathology-but the model has frayed and survives more powerfully in university humanities departments than in the general psychiatric clinic. Freud's magisterial imaginings have now to be supplemented by all the contributions of the various scientific fields that have added to our understanding of what makes human beings human. Sciences that were barely hinted at in Freud's time are now part of our daily heuristic and therapeutic armamentarium.
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Reading case reports or journal articles in the past few years, one sees that the pendulum has swung from the accepted humanist psychological model of the analysts or the old-time listening physician (who really could do very little more than listen and empathize, given the paucity of therapeutic tools available) to one that structures the therapeutic encounter almost entirely as a psychopharmacological exercise. True, there is cognitive-behavioural therapy, as well as other variously labelled elaborations of the "talking cures," but these have had a tendency to be colonized by other mental health disciplines, leaving many psychiatrists in the role of pill prescribers.
Perhaps this change in practice can be explained as a rational response to the power of the new medications, compared with the endless and expensive hit-and-miss techniques of psychoanalytically based therapies. Moreover, the demand for evidence-based medicine is more easily satisfied by drug dosages and questionnaires that can be expressed-very properly-in numbers, which could be described as the poker chips of statistical analysis yet nevertheless constitute the currency of scientific and intellectual respectability.
Nonetheless, with all the emphasis on brain functions, neurotransmitters, and drug therapies, when it comes to exam-driven case histories, candidates are still often resorting to a tattered schema drawing on developmental, sociological, and experiential models that attempt to crowd the whole of the Adolf Meyerian torpedo into a couple of paragraphs. Very few candidates come equipped to handle the challenge of describing the complexities of the physical-psychosocial human being (to extend the venerable dyad with one additional category). Quite simply, very few training programs provide the wide range of necessary background education. The reality of ever-expanding curriculum demands squeezes the "soft sloppy psychological questions" into less and less time.
While Professor Reading says in his introduction that "the focus of this book is . . . on the special capacities humans have for processing time," his statement sells this small book short. It is a beautifully constructed, coherent model of human functioning, leading from lucid descriptions of the neuroanatomical and physiological substrate of mental functioning through to cognitive emotional development and the subtly complex needs human beings have for a range of attachments, from the most elemental appetites to the grand categories of hope and despair. He gives a splendid account of humankind's unique capacity for experiencing the world of symbols as opposed to the here-and-now concrete facts of immediate experience. With that capacity comes the ability to anticipate the future, to plan-in short, to hope. On the way to his conclusion, Reading provides what I can only call a superb overview of normative human development and emotional, social, and intellectual capabilities. He draws on many sources and provides excellent notes at the end of the book. It should be required reading for all residents, indeed for most practising psychiatrists.
